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ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I study a fascinating problem – what are the legal, political 
and economic implications of regulating executive bonuses? While the 
Administration’s recent consideration of proposals to tax bonuses of AIG 
executives has sparked a great deal of media speculation and attention, there has 
been little legal scholarship discussing the various possible consequences of this 
and other methods of regulating executive compensation.  Especially given the 
growing interest in executive compensation and the possible benefits and costs of 
regulation in this arena, I believe this paper will make a significant scholarly 
contribution to the existing literature on corporate governance and tax policy with 
respect to executive compensation. 
                                                          
1 Stanford Law School, J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011. 
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While the media has focused on public outrage and resulting political 
pressures to punish executives that took excessive risk while compensating 
themselves handsomely, the little legal literature on the subject has focused almost 
exclusively on constitutional and contractual dimensions.  Economists and scholars 
of human capital, however, also raise issues around potential disincentive effects 
of such measures (for instance, would excessive controls on compensation 
dissuade talent from seeking such jobs?).  In addition, there is an ongoing debate 
on whether or not there is even a relationship between executive incentive 
mechanisms and firm performance – while some scholars argue that performance-
contingent compensation does indeed improve firm-level financial outcomes others 
argue just the opposite.  In general, the literature on incentive effects and the pay 
for performance relationship has the potential to inform the current debate on 
taxing executive bonuses.  
In sum, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no attempt to integrate 
or synthesize the different factors - legal, political, and economic- that impact the 
potential costs and benefits of taxing or otherwise regulating executive bonuses 
and other forms of incentive compensation retroactively.  I conduct a systematic 
review of the legal studies literature and the literature on incentive effects of 
executive bonuses, and consolidate them into a concise, simple framework that 
distinguishes ex ante controls on compensation with ex post controls, and contrasts 
process-oriented policy options with content-oriented ones.  As I  offer a concise 
and comprehensive account of the various factors that affect the costs and benefits 
of regulating executive compensation and identify unanswered issues, legal and 
other, I conclude that no single policy is going to act as a “silver bullet.”  My 
critical review of each of these policy choices reveals that the problems associated 
with executive compensation are endemic to the flawed U.S. corporate governance 
structure, and thus cannot be mitigated without fundamental structural reform in 
that broader system. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 that began with the collapse of the 
subprime mortgage market also led to the collapse of several preeminent financial 
firms, the paralysis of credit markets, and significant declines in the stock markets.  
These events in the U.S. threatened to plunge the world economies into a deep and 
lasting global recession.  On October 3, 2008, the 110th Congress of the United 
States passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) which included, 
among other measures aimed at mitigating the duration and severity of the 
financial crisis, four major provisions that would potentially limit executive pay 
levels and compensation mechanisms that encouraged excessive risk taking.  These 
four provisions included limits on pay (to ensure that senior executives were not 
incentivized to undertake excessive risks), lowering of the cap on tax-deductibility 
of top executive officer compensation from $1 million to $500,000 (including 
performance-based pay), “clawbacks” of any bonuses or incentive compensation 
paid to senior executives if subsequent financial reports were proven to be 
materially inaccurate, and the probation or limitation on golden parachutes in cases 
of severance.  A subsequent press released by the Treasury Department on October 
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14th clarified, however, that the applicability of these provisions was contingent on 
whether the government (i) had purchased the firm’s assets through the Troubled 
Assets Auction Program, or (ii) had provided equity capital to the financial 
institution through the Capital Purchase Program and/or (iii) had provided direct 
assistance to an institution at risk of failing.2  In February 2009, President Obama 
observed that executive pay schemes that rewarded risk taking while protecting the 
executive from the downside to such risk taking had played a major role in the 
financial crisis.3  
Longitudinal analyses of the executive compensation practices at three major 
financial institutions also lend scholarly credence to President Obama’s 
aforementioned observation.  In a case study of Fannie Mae’s executive 
compensation practices during the 2000-2004 time period,4 Bebchuk and Fried 
conclude that Fannie Mae’s executive pay arrangements “provided executives with 
large amounts of camouflaged pay unrelated to performance, diluted and even 
distorted the executives incentives, and failed to clearly disclose the value of the 
retirement packages promised and given to executives.”5  In another case study of 
compensation practices at Bear Stearns and Lehman Bros. during the 2000-2008 
time period, the researchers again conclude that the top executives of those two 
firms cashed out large amounts of performance-contingent compensation that were 
not clawed back when their firms collapsed and also gained significant wealth 
through equity sales.6  While the firms collapsed and shareholders suffered 
catastrophic losses, its top executives experienced substantive positive net payoffs 
for the period.7 
Two central concerns remain at the core of the renewed attention of 
lawmakers on executive pay, the continued media attention8 on executive bonuses 
and payouts, especially at firms that benefitted from the government bailout, and 
the surge in scholarly articles dissecting pay practices and executive decisions at 
firms that collapsed.  Interestingly, neither one of these two concerns is particularly 
new, in that both concerns have not only received extensive scholarly attention but 
have also been the focus of multiple regulatory interventions in the past two 
decades.  The first concern revolves around the issue of executive pay levels and 
                                                          
2 V.G. Narayanan, Fabrizio Ferri & Lisa Brem, Executive Pay and the Credit Crisis of 2008 1, 20 
(Harvard Business School 109-036, 2009) (summarizing executive compensation provisions in the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008).  
3 V.G. Narayanan & Lisa Brem, Executive Pay and the Credit Crisis of 2008(B) 1, 1 (Harvard 
Business School 110-005, 2009). 
4 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of 
Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. CORP. L. 807 (2005). 
5 Id. at 821. 
6 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Executive 
Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008 (The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper 
Series, No. 657, 2009), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Bebchuk_657.pdf.   
7 See Louise Story, Executives Kept Wealth as Firms Failed, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 
2009, at B3. 
8 See id.; see also Basil J. Whiting & Joseph Mirzoeff et al., Letters to the Editor, Time to Tax 
Those Bankers’ Bonuses?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at A30; Graham Bowley, Morgan Stanley’s 
Quarter is Weak, Unlike Its Pay Pool, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at B1; Attacking the Corporate Gravy 
Train, ECONOMIST, May 30, 2009; Bank Incentives Are All Wrong, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2009.  
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whether CEOs (and other senior executives) receive excessive amounts of 
compensation.  Some scholars have argued that executive pay levels reflect the 
marginal product of the executive that is assumed to be proportional to the talent of 
the executive and the size of the firm, such that larger firms are willing to pay 
more for the same talent.9  A related argument suggests that pressure from the 
market for managers forces firms to develop the optimal compensation strategies, 
including pay levels, because otherwise they will fail to attract talented 
managers.10  An increasingly visible group of scholars, however, believe that 
excessively high pay levels are a reflection not of rare talent or exceptional skills, 
but of executive power and lax corporate governance regimes,11 and that a 
significant proportion of CEOs are paid too much relative to the benchmarks of 
firm size or complexity.12  The increasing disparity between average CEO pay and 
the average hourly employee’s pay during the 1980s and 1990s further fueled this 
concern and manifested itself in increasingly public expressions of anger and 
outrage at the pay levels of executives.13 
The second concern is focused on whether or not executives who have been 
compensated handsomely through performance-contingent pay schemes (notably 
stock options) have indeed contributed to stronger firm performance (typically 
measured in terms of appreciation in shareholder value).  The pay-for-performance 
issue has garnered intense academic scrutiny in a wide range of fields including 
accounting, finance, management, and legal studies.  With the exception of a small 
number of scholars who argue that executive pay is positively correlated with firm 
performance,14 the general consensus is that there is either a very weak or no 
relationship between executives’ incentive pay and their firms’ financial 
performance.  Indeed, the most recent crises in the financial sector have prompted 
the observation that option-loaded executives led to the failure of their firms 
through excessive risk taking.15  
Nearly two decades ago, Jensen and Murphy concluded that senior 
executives do not seem to be paid according to their performance, based on their 
empirical finding of low pay-performance sensitivity in a sample of Forbes 
executives from 1977-1988.16  Ten years after that study, Murphy concluded, 
                                                          
9 See generally Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845 (1981). 
10 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 
(1980); Steven N. Kaplan, Are U.S. CEOs Overpaid?, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 5 (May 2008). 
11 See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & J.M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Harvard Univ. Press 2004); see also Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Manager-Specific Investments, 
25 J. FIN. ECON. 123 (1989).  
12 See Eugene Kandel, In Search of Reasonable Executive Compensation, 55 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 
405 (2009). 
13 In 1980, the average CEO made forty-two times the average hourly worker; this ratio increased 
to 107 times by 1990 and, by 2000, the ratio had climbed to 525 times.  See Meredith R. Conway, 
Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 383, 384 (2008). 
14 Kaplan, supra note 10, at 11.  
15 Bebchuk & Fried, Compensation at Fannie Mae, supra note 4, at 814-15; Bebchuk et al., supra 
note 6, at 12-16. 
16 See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 
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based on a comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical research on pay 
practices for chief executive officers, that a large gap remained between the 
interests of managers and shareholders;17 and that, while factors such as executive 
risk aversion,18 company size, and volatility may partly explain low pay-
performance sensitivities, these factors still exacerbate rather than ameliorate the 
major conflict of interest between executives and shareholders.  Bertrand and 
Mullainathan found that CEOs are more frequently rewarded for luck rather than 
performance,19 suggesting that managers are either paid too much or they are paid 
inefficiently.  Bebchuk and Fried in particular document a long list of executive 
pay practices that have little to do with performance and impose a huge cost on 
shareholders, while providing senior executives with extremely generous benefits 
especially in the forms of huge loans, consulting, pension benefits and stock option 
grants with high upside returns and zero downside risk.20 
Interestingly, not only are these concerns about excessive executive pay both 
old and recurring, but the allegedly ‘new’ policies being implemented under the 
EESA are in fact little more than targeted applications of existing regulations.  In 
particular, starting in the mid 1980s several tax-related reforms were put in place to 
rein in executive pay and motivate a closer link between pay and performance.21  
In addition to tax-focused reforms, several other regulations (e.g., under the 
auspices of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) passed in 2002)22 enacted in the past 
two decades have also focused on addressing executive compensation-related 
issues.23  What have been the outcomes of these efforts?  And what can we learn 
from these outcomes going forward?  To answer these questions, the rest of the 
Article provides a focused review of these reforms as follows.  The second section 
                                                          
98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990). 
17 See generally Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 
(O. Ashfelter & David Card eds., 1999). 
18 See, e.g., Joseph G. Haubrich, Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent 
Problem, 102 J. POL. ECON. 258 (1994).  Haubrich notes that the Jensen-Murphy conclusion of low 
pay-performance sensitivity is quite consistent with the predictions of agency theory for sufficiently 
risk-averse executives.  Id. at 260. 
19 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded For Luck? The Ones 
Without Principals Are, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 901 (2001). Bertrand and Mullainathan defined luck as 
“changes in firm performance beyond the CEO’s control” and used oil price movements, changes in 
exchange rates, and average industry performance to measure luck.  Id. at 901-02. 
20 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 11, at 121-46. 
21 Id.  
22 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2009).  Specifically, the Act:  
disallows loans from corporations to their executives, a type of compensation 
heavily criticized by Bebchuk and Fried (2004). Second, since the CEO and 
Chief Financial Officer must now personally certify financial statements, if those 
statements are materially revised, the CEO is required to give the company back 
100% of his or her performance-based compensation. Third, it requires that the 
majority of the board be independent, and that the nominating and compensation 
committees be entirely independent.   
Id.  Ian Dew-Becker, How Much Sunlight Does It Take to Disinfect a Boardroom? A Short 
History of Executive Compensation Regulation in America, 55 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 434, 452-53 
(2009) (detailing empirical studies of say-on-pay). 
23 Joy S. Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation Through the 
Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 490 (2009). 
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of this Article reviews the intent and consequences of major tax policy changes 
focused on executive compensation.  In the third section, a simple framework is 
developed to organize and critically review other non-tax related reforms and 
solutions.  Finally, the concluding section relates executive compensation 
challenges to the broader structural issues that have plagued corporate governance 
reforms over several decades, and identifies some useful policy implications of 
these challenges. 
2. USING TAX POLICY TO REGULATE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: HAS IT 
WORKED? 
Prior to the mid-1980s, tax law did not play a direct role in regulating 
executive compensation, in that the tax code’s effect applied to the executive only 
as it applied to any and all other taxpayers.24  However, following the increasing 
public (and media) attention on excessive executive pay levels, and continued 
focus on the low sensitivity of pay to corporate performance, Congress enacted tax 
code provisions intended to (a) curtail excessive growth in pay levels and (b) align 
executive pay closer to firm performance.  The two most important tax code 
provisions implemented to achieve these twin objectives were section 162(m)25 
and section 280(g).  The rest of this section will mainly focus on section 162(m) 
because it has garnered the most attention in the legal studies literature and is 
generally recognized as the tax provision that was intended to have the most far-
reaching effects on executive compensation.  In the interest of being complete, 
however, a brief commentary on the effectiveness of the other provision will be 
provided at the conclusion of this section.   
2.1 § 162(m): Has it Worked? 
On August 10, 1993, Congress enacted section 162(m) to disallow deduction 
for annual compensation that was considered allowable as an ordinary and 
necessary business expense under prevalent tax code.26  Specifically, section 
162(m) prohibits a deduction in excess of $1 million for compensation paid by a 
publicly held corporation to its CEO and the next four highest paid officers in the 
corporation subject to the following exceptions.27  The $1 million limit does not 
apply to commissions, performance-based compensation, qualified retirement plan 
contributions, and nontaxable fringe benefits, with the most significant of these 
exceptions being the one for performance-based compensation.  Section 162(m) 
deemed compensation as performance-based only if it is “payable solely on 
account of the attainment of one or more performance goals,” where such goals 
must be “established by a compensation committee of outside directors, approved 
by shareholders, and certified by the company’s compensation committee as 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 162(m), 107 Stat. 312 
(1993) [hereinafter § 162(m)]. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
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having been met.”28  The caps on deductibility of non-performance based pay and 
the exceptions granted for performance based-pay reflect the twin objectives of 
curtailing executive pay levels and encouraging stronger connection between pay 
and performance.  However, a review of the evidence on the effectiveness of this 
provision yields some dismal conclusions.  In sum, as revealed next through a 
focused review of scholarly evidence, the consensus is that section 162(m) has 
resulted in many unintended negative consequences even as it has not reduced 
either overall compensation levels for senior executives or strengthened the pay-
for-performance relationship. 
Section 162(m) was intended to stop or at least curb increases in executive 
salaries.  Instead, many studies have found that it resulted in higher salaries 
because of several reasons.  First, it allowed corporations to avoid the problem 
merely by substituting cash forms of compensation with stock options and other 
types of performance-contingent pay that were exempt under this provision.29  
Alternatively, firms awarded higher salaries but then deferred payment until 
retirement, thus circumventing completely the $1 million cap.  Of particular note 
was the unintended effect this legislation had on firms that paid their CEOs less 
than $1 million and that were not directly affected by the provision.  Because the 
new law decreased such firms’ implicit costs of contracting, firms who expected to 
pay their CEOs less than $1 million had unexpected increases in their CEOs’ cash 
compensation and the magnitude of these increases was directly proportional to 
how far the CEO’s expected compensation fell below the $1 million standard.30  
These changes occurred relative to the period before the enactment of section 
162(m) and persisted into the following year offering support for the conclusion 
that the changes were indeed precipitated by the tax legislation.31  Furthermore, 
although this provision was intended to discourage corporations from paying 
excessive non-performance-based compensation to their executives by making it 
more costly to do so, many corporations demonstrated a willingness to forego a 
deduction in order to pay their executives whatever they deemed appropriate.  In 
other words, by forfeiting deductions, the companies signal their willingness to 
shoulder increased tax liability rather than forcing their executives to accept lower 
pay levels.32  Reflecting these unintended effects of the new tax rule, executive pay 
                                                          
28 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2006). 
29 See Conway, supra note 13, at 410. 
30 See David G. Harris & J.R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as an Implicit Contracting 
Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997, 1015 
(2002).  Harris and Livingstone define implicit contracting costs as “non contractual costs that third 
parties impose on firms by reacting adversely to firms’ behaviors.”  Id.  
31 See id. at 998.  
Our results are consistent with the theory of implicit contracting costs. If 
Congress’s $1 million standard influenced third parties’ beliefs about how much 
compensation was reasonable, then the implicit contracting costs of CEO 
compensation for firms paying less than $1 million fell when Congress enacted a 
standard for reasonable compensation at a level higher than such firms otherwise 
would have paid. A reduction in implicit contracting cost should induce firms to 
pay more CEO compensation to earn greater revenue and additional profits.  
Id. 
32 Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation through the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE 
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levels seem to have grown considerably in the period after the introduction of 
section 162(m).33  The average total pay of S&P 500 CEOs rose from $2.6 million 
in 1993 to $14 million in 2000.  Even after the stock market crash of 2002, the 
average total CEO pay was $9.4 million.  In addition, the new provision appears to 
have resulted in significant changes in the composition of executive pay – while 
base salary contributed 37% of average total CEO pay in 1991, it dropped by 19% 
by 2002, a change mainly explained by the increased use of stock options whose 
share in average total CEO pay went up from 24% in 1993 to 47% in 2002.  The 
increased use of performance-contingent pay may appear consistent with the 
intention of section 162(m), namely, to increase the sensitivity of performance to 
pay among publicly held corporations.  But a deeper look at the evidence reveals 
that the structural shifts in executive pay have had minimal, if at all any, positive 
effects on increasing pay-for-performance sensitivity. 
The empirical evidence on whether and how much section 162(m) increased 
the pay-performance sensitivity among public U.S. corporations in general 
supports the conclusion that, at best, this provision has been a “blunt” policy 
instrument with little effect on either firm growth rates, or the overall pay-
performance relationship.34  Because stock-options are considered performance-
based and therefore excluded from the deduction of limitations of section 162(m), 
there was a dramatic increase in the use of stock options to compensate executives 
even as the stock market itself experienced unanticipated massive growth in the 
late 1990s.  On average, stock options made up three to five percent of a 
company’s stock in 1994 but this percentage tripled to twelve to fifteen percent by 
2002.  In addition, about 80% of the increase in average compensation of CEOs 
between 1992 and 2000 was primarily due to the increased use of stock options.35  
The tax treatment of stock options became even more attractive with the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997 and the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (these acts 
lowered the maximum capital gains tax rate from 28% to 20%).  Under the new 
laws, executives did not have to pay income taxes on incentive-based stock options 
                                                          
L. REV. 877 (2007) (detailing a more nuanced analysis of the implications of deduction forfeiture by 
corporations pursuant to § 162(m)). 
33 See Robert F. Gox, Tax Incentives for Inefficient Executive Pay and Reward for Luck, 13 REV. 
ACCT. STUD. 452, 453 (2008).   See also Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive 
Compensation, 14 TAX POL’Y. & ECON. 1 (2000); Hall and Liebman use the Execucomp database to 
examine pay levels for the highest-paid executives in each of the firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap 
400, and S&P Smallcap 600, and conclude that “executive compensation clearly continued to rise at a 
rapid rate after the implementation of the million-dollar rule, though perhaps at a slower rate than it 
otherwise would have.”  Id. at 33.  
34 See Nancy L. Rose & C. Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the Tax Code to Influence 
CEO Compensation, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 138, 139 (2002).  In their empirical analysis, Rose and Wolfram 
use data on nearly 1400 publicly-traded U.S. corporations to examine the effects of § 162(m) on CEO 
pay to observe as follows,  
[t]here is little evidence that the deductibility cap has had some significant effects 
on overall executive compensation levels or growth rates at firms likely to be 
affected by the deductibility cap, however, nor is there evidence that it has 
increased the performance sensitivity of CEO pay at these firms. We conclude 
that corporate pay decisions seem to be relatively insulated from this type of 
blunt policy intervention.  
Id. (excerpted from their abstract). 
35 See Conway, supra note 13, at 408.  
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(also known as qualified options) as long as they did not exercise it within two 
years of the grant date.  Further reductions in capital gains tax rates that occurred 
in 2003 made qualified options even more attractive for executives. 
However, as noted earlier in the introduction section of the Article, empirical 
studies of compensation practices during the 1990s reveal little, if any, systematic 
positive effects of the use of stock options (and other forms of performance-
contingent pay) on corporate performance.  Indeed, many scholars believe that 
CEOs are more frequently awarded for luck rather than performance and that any 
gains that shareholders may have experienced during the 1990s are more 
attributable to stock price fluctuations than the performance of the executive.36 
Indeed, some scholars have gone as far as to argue that the increased use of stock 
options resulted in an incentive for executives to engage in risky or illegal behavior 
to maximize short-term returns.  Representing this viewpoint, Conway observes,  
because executive compensation was tied to stock prices, executives had a motive 
to try to increase stock price to allow the executives to cash out their stock options 
at a profit.  Because the executives did not represent true ownership interests in the 
corporation and instead were employees, they could have been motivated to act in 
the interests of short-term benefits to realize their compensation rather than what 
would be in the best interests of the corporation in the long term.  This resulted in 
many executives taking unnecessary risks and engaging in unethical and sometimes 
illegal activities to maximize short-term profits to ensure a sizeable compensation 
amount.37 
At their peak in 2001, when stock options accounted for over 50% of the pay 
of CEOs of major US corporations, options-loaded CEOs delivered more big 
losses than big gains.38  Moreover, the use of options also gives executives an 
incentive to manipulate the options grants dates, leading to the corporate fraud of 
stock option back-dating.39  Congress obviously did not anticipate (or intend) the 
well-documented adverse effects of certain types of performance-contingent plans 
(especially stock options) and executive behaviors that compromised shareholder 
interests may have occurred even in the absence of legislative changes.  However, 
a reasonable conclusion that is best reflective of available empirical evidence is 
that section 162(m) did not address in any significant manner a major concern that 
precipitated the rule, i.e., the absence of a significant relationship between 
executive pay and performance.  Instead, it may have actually exacerbated 
excessive risk taking by executives seeking to maximize their personal gains at the 
expense of shareholders.40 
                                                          
36 Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 19; see also Gox, supra note 33. 
37 Conway, supra note 13, at 413-14. 
38 Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of CEO Stock 
Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1055 (2007). 
39 See Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives 
Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513 (2009).  They estimate that 13.6% of all 
option grants to top executives during the 1996-2005 time period were backdated or otherwise 
manipulated.  Id.  
40 Mullane, supra note 23, at 536.  Mullane argues that tax penalties may be good politics, but are 
ineffective policy tools that penalize shareholders, consumers, and workers more than the executives.  
Id.  For example, if a company absorbs the corporate tax rather than passing this cost to their executives 
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2.2 § 280G (Tax Penalty on Golden Parachute Compensation): Has that 
Worked? 
The first direct attempt by Congress to regulate executive compensation 
through tax penalties took place in 1984 when it enacted section 280G and section 
4999 to limit excessive payments under golden parachute41 agreements.  While 
section 280G applied to the corporation, section 4999 applied to the individual 
receiving payments under the golden parachute agreement.  Section 280G 
disallowed a deduction for any “excess parachute payment.”42  Section 4999 then 
imposed a nondeductible twenty percent tax on any executive who has received an 
excess parachute payment under the preceding provision.  Section 280G (and 
section 4999) were enacted in response to the enormous golden parachute 
payments executives received in the 1980s as a result of the flurry of mergers that 
took place during that time period.  They were also intended to discourage 
companies from unduly influencing the market for corporate control – for example, 
by putting in place golden parachute agreements that would make acquiring the 
company prohibitively expensive.  However, while the legislative intent of these 
provisions was to protect the shareholders from excessive amounts paid to 
executives, the realized effects have been far from positive.  
For one, companies exploited the exceptions in the provisions to avoid tax 
penalties.  For example, companies could sidestep the restrictions just by showing 
that golden parachute payments reflected personal services offered by the 
executive on or after the date of change in control of the corporation or that such 
payments were made for services already provided by the executive before the 
change in control occurred.  Even more problematic, companies opted more often 
than not to pay additional amounts to executives to cover the additional taxes, thus 
costing the shareholders even more.43  Summarizing the unintended (negative) 
effects of restrictions on golden parachutes imposed by section 280G, Mullane 
notes,  
                                                          
(in order to protect the executive’s pay levels in the post 162(m) period) it effectively lowers the 
company’s after-tax profits and shareholders will then bear the burden in the form of a smaller after-tax 
return on their equity investments.  Id.   
41 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (6th ed. 1990).  “Golden parachute” is a term used to 
describe a lucrative compensation package granted as severance payment to executives in the event of a 
change in control (e.g., because of a merger or acquisition).  Id.  Although specific forms and terms of 
payment vary across golden parachute agreements, in general such agreements “provide[] for 
substantial bonuses and other benefits for top management and certain directors who may be forced to 
leave the target company or otherwise voluntarily leave upon a change in control.”  Id.    
42 See I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(3), (d)(2).  A parachute payment under this provision is defined as a 
payment made under the conditions of change in corporate control and is an amount equal to or greater 
than three times a “base amount.”  Id.  The base amount is defined as the executive’s average 
annualized taxable compensation for the last five years or the average compensation during the 
executive’s tenure with the company, whichever time period is shorter.  Id.  The difference between the 
base amount and the actual payment under the parachute is considered “excess parachute payment” and 
the difference is non-deductible.  Id. 
43 Omari S. Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation 
Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 347 (2009).  Conway, supra note 13, at 414-19 (providing a detailed 
discussion of the provisions, exceptions, and gaps between the intent and the realized consequences of § 
280G).  
RAJAGOPALAN_-_FORMAT_COMPLETE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:06 PM 
2011 REFORMING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 435 
 
[t]he theory was that the tax penalties would in most instances render them too 
costly to authorize or receive.  The reality is many companies continue to authorize 
golden parachutes that, if triggered, would provide payments above the limit 
defined as reasonable by Congress.  In that way, these companies have voluntarily 
assumed potentially greater costs than Congress imposed.44 
3. CURBING EXCESSIVE PAY AND INCREASING SENSITIVITY OF PAY TO 
PERFORMANCE: IF TAX PENALTIES DO NOT WORK, WHAT DOES? 
The empirical effects of two major tax–related regulations on executive 
compensation practices reviewed in the previous section can perhaps best be 
summarized as good for politics but bad for economics.  Reflecting the view that 
taxation policy appears to be of limited use when it comes to either curbing 
excessive pay or strengthening the pay-for-performance relationship, there has 
been a renewed debate on evaluating alternative mechanisms (most of which are 
already being used) to address the two issues around executive compensation that 
have provoked so much public outrage and political attention.  These alternatives 
vary in terms of their focus on the process versus content of executive pay 
packages as well as in their relative emphasis on ex-ante versus ex-post solutions.  
Process-focused (or procedural) solutions include calls for increased transparency, 
increased board vigilance and monitoring, and shareholder say-on-pay; content-
oriented solutions primarily focus on the amount/type of pay and include equity-
based pay and contingent compensation contracts, pay caps and tax penalties, and 
clawbacks.  Ex-ante solutions focus on actions that are taken prior to the 
determination of an executive pay package such as say-on-pay votes, caps on pay 
levels, greater board oversight and monitoring through independent compensation 
committees and the like, while ex-post remedies include mechanisms such as 
retroactive clawbacks and shareholder lawsuits against board members for breach 
of fiduciary duty.  
While a comprehensive review of these alternatives and their relative pros 
and cons is beyond the scope of this Article, a focused critical review of the most 
frequently used options is a worthwhile exercise because such a review can 
provide the basis for a deeper debate on the costs versus benefits of various options 
from a policy standpoint.  The table below categorizes these options into a simple 
conceptual scheme, using the process versus content and ex-ante versus ex-post 
dimensions described earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 Mullane, supra note 23, at 519. 
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 Content-oriented Process-oriented 
 
Ex-ante 
 
Pay caps and tax penalties; 
Equity-based pay (including 
contingent pay contracts) 
Prospective clawbacks 
Greater shareholder 
involvement: Say-on-Pay and 
the role of institutional owners;  
Increased board vigilance  & 
monitoring 
 
Ex-post 
 
Retroactive clawbacks 
 
Greater transparency and 
completeness in disclosure; 
Increased board accountability 
and shareholder lawsuits  
3.1 Pay Caps and Tax Penalties 
While there is a general sense of outrage over the increasing disparity 
between CEO pay and the average worker’s earnings (as discussed in the 
introduction part of the Article), it appears that most of this outrage (at least in 
contemporary legal scholarship and among financial economists) stems not so 
much from the actual amounts of pay as it does from the weak justification of pay 
from the standpoint of firm performance.  This viewpoint is shared even by those 
legal scholars who have been most vocal about the need for serious reform in 
executive compensation.45  Most corporate law scholars seem to care more about 
corporate governance rather than general inequality in income.46  Financial 
economists also by and large agree that compensation levels should be determined 
by the unfettered interplay of market forces reflecting the demand and supply of 
managerial talent (and hence, the value of specific types of human capital) and 
should be based on efficient contracting principles that reflect the preferences of 
both the parties to the compensation contract (the firm and the manager).47  In fact, 
some have even questioned the appropriateness of the pay caps most recently 
imposed under the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”) on 
financial institutions benefitting from tax-payer funded bailouts.  For example, in 
his testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 
J.W. Verret noted, 
[p]ay restrictions will also limit banks in their competition for top talent, which 
risks exacerbating the banking crisis.  Immediately following the announcement of 
compensation restrictions by the Obama Administration, Bank of America 
                                                          
45  See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 11, at 9.  They note that  
[i]t is worth emphasizing that our criticism of executive pay arrangements does 
not focus on the amount of compensation received by executives. In our view, 
high absolute levels of pay do not by themselves imply that compensation 
arrangements deviate from arms-length contracting. Our conclusion that such 
deviations have been common is based primarily on an analysis of the processes 
by which pay is set, as well as on examining the inefficient, distorted, and 
nontransparent structure of pay arrangements.  
Id. 
46 Brett H. McDonnell, Two Goals for Executive Compensation Reform, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
585 (2007).  
47 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 6; Kaplan, supra note 10, at 2. 
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indicated that Deutsche Bank poached 12 of its highest performing executives and 
other reports indicated that UBS was hiring financial advisors from TARP firms 
with compensation increases  as high as 200%.  In a global environment, 
restrictions may place American banks at a competitive disadvantage.48  
Notwithstanding the aforementioned reservations, the current pay caps 
imposed under EESA can at least be justified from a political standpoint (public 
sentiment and related political fallout would have been even more negative if the 
government had not imposed these caps on firms being bailed out with taxpayer 
money).  However, the evidence on the effectiveness of pay caps imposed under 
more permanent tax reforms (discussed earlier in the second section of this Article) 
clearly indicates that ex-ante pay caps have most likely had greater adverse than 
positive outcomes.  While such caps may assuage public resentment of excessive 
payments at the highest levels of corporate America, the evidence on their 
effectiveness to date indicates that pay caps, per se, are among the least effective 
either in curbing unjustified pay increases or in aligning compensation more 
closely with the interests of shareholders.  Accordingly, to address these problems, 
changes to the structure (rather than levels) of pay have been proposed and the 
most significant structural changes focus on the proportion of equity-based pay in 
the compensation package.  Again, various forms of equity-based pay (especially 
stock options) have been extensively used especially in the two decades – the pros 
and cons of using equity-based pay schemes to alleviate the pay-performance 
problem is discussed next. 
3.2 Equity-Based Pay and Contingent Pay Contracts 
The lack of a strong relationship between executive pay and performance 
(and the negative effects of an increased reliance on stock options to tie managerial 
incentives to firm performance as documented earlier in this Article) have led to a 
renewed focus on the pros and cons of equity-based pay.  In principle, equity-
based compensation can provide managers with desirable incentives even though, 
in practice, such plans have enabled executives to reap substantial rewards even 
when their firms’ suffered huge financial losses.  If not designed with care, equity-
based pay plans can end up motivating executive behaviors that destroy 
shareholder value.  Hall identifies six major challenges in designing equity-based 
pay plans that can appropriately align executives’ incentives with those of 
shareholders: mismatched time horizons, gaming, the value-cost wedge, the 
leverage-fragility tradeoff, the alignment of risk-taking incentives, and the 
                                                          
48 J.W. Verret, Unintended Consequences of Executive Compensation Regulation Threatens to 
Worsen the Financial Crisis (GEORGE MASON UNIV. LAW & ECON. PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 34, 
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id= 1436658.  Jamal Ibrahim Haidar, A Note on the 
Regulation of Executive Compensation Within the 2009 US (Bailout), INT’L J. REG. & GOVERNANCE 
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515508 (voicing similar concerns as a World Bank 
Economist).  Haidar observes that the caps on executive compensation placed by EESA are 
counterproductive because these caps will result in the flight of more able executives and place 
damaged firms in the hands of less-able managers, further exacerbating the problems of 
mismanagement.   
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avoidance of excessive compensation.49  The challenge of mismatched time 
horizons between executives and shareholders is manifested in executive behaviors 
aimed at maximizing the short-term earnings to boost the value of their equity 
holdings.  Executives prefer shorter vesting periods for their stock plans because it 
makes their compensation less risky and many companies also give executives 
broad freedom to exercise their options as soon as they are vested such that 
executives are able to time the unloading of their shares to benefit from short-term 
surges in share value.  The second challenge – gaming – refers to managers’ 
tendencies to engage in questionable and even illegal behaviors to artificially boost 
stock prices.  Such behaviors may be motivated not only by the incentives to reap 
the enormous gains from unloading shares at their peak prices but to also meet the 
quarterly earnings’ expectations of Wall Street.  Indeed, some have argued that the 
root of the short-term behavior in corporate America lies in the pressure companies 
feel to meet quarterly predictions on their earnings and a focus on reforming pay 
schemes without addressing this fundamental problem will be of very limited 
use.50   
Some proposed solutions to these challenges include the following: reducing 
windfalls in equity-based compensation by indexing the exercise price of stock 
options (for example, to the stock price of the worst-performing firms in the 
industry); increasing the vesting period and requiring executives to hold company 
stock over longer time periods; and requiring executives to disclose in advance 
their intention to sell shares along with details on the proposed sale.  However, 
while some of these steps may help, to some extent at least, mitigate the problems 
associated with mismatched time horizons and gaming, they are not likely to 
address the more fundamental issue associated with equity-based plans: the value-
cost “wedge” that stems from the general rule that the value to the executive of 
equity pay is typically much lower than its cost to the shareholders.51  The fourth 
trade-off in designing equity-based plans – between leverage and fragility – is 
particularly salient in the design of multi-year stock options plans, where the 
challenge is to create sufficiently high upside potential for incentive alignment 
(leverage) while at the same time protecting the company’s ability to retain and 
motivate its executives in the event of sharp declines in stock prices (fragility).  In 
addition, the design of optimal equity-based pay options are extremely complex 
because it is very hard, if not impossible, to assess, ex-ante, the optimal level of 
risk-taking for a given company (such that equity pay packages can be designed in 
a manner to incentivize executives to manage corporate assets in a manner that 
would be consistent with the firm’s risk profile).  And, finally, even the most 
conscientious boards may find it very difficult to determine the optimal level of 
equity-based pay because they may not always understand how much value they 
are transferring to executives, and ex-ante expectations may be completely out of 
                                                          
49 See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 J. APPLIED CORP.  FIN. 24, 
30 (2003).  
50 Verret, supra note 48. 
51 Hall, supra note 49, at 26 (pointing out that the value-to-cost ratio depends, among other factors, 
on the degree of diversification of the executive’s stock portfolio, the executive’s risk aversion, stock 
volatility, and vesting period).  
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line with the ex-post gains from such grants.52  
It is fairly obvious that there is no standard, “one-size-fits-all” approach that 
is optimal in determining the proportion of equity-based pay in the compensation 
package of the executive as well as the specific timing and structure of such plans.  
This, in turn, has prompted increasing attention to the design of contingent pay 
schemes that take into account critical firm-specific and executive-specific 
contingencies in determining the levels and types of incentive pay.  Kandel argues 
that boards have to pay close attention to the specific CEO and the current state of 
the firm in determining the level and structure of pay packages, including the 
firm’s growth options, the potential effect of the CEO on the firm, the CEO’s 
wealth, likely tenure with the firm, etc.  He proposes three generic contracts – 
aggressive, conservative, and intermediate – that take into account critical 
contingencies in the firm’s operating context and the executive’s wealth and risk 
preferences.53  However, the key challenge in designing contingent pay contracts is 
determining the underlying contingencies, which will decide the optimal solution 
in a given situation, especially because such contingencies may be endogenous 
rather than exogenous to the pay scheme itself.  For instance, the level of risk faced 
by the company can change as a function of the executive’s strategic decisions and 
can also change over time as a result of changes in the broader operating context 
(e.g., changes in technology, competitive choices of other firms).  It is also very 
difficult to reliably assess the level and type of effort that will be exerted by 
managers and their underlying abilities; indeed, the effort of the manager may be 
better revealed in ex-post performance metrics rather than ex-ante measures.54  
Given the myriad of challenges associated with designing optimal ex-ante 
pay packages, many scholars and policy makers have suggested the use of 
measures that allow companies (and their shareholders) to force executives to 
refund their compensation if performance expectations are not met or if it becomes 
clear that the executives’ actions and choices resulted in value destruction.  One 
such mechanism that has been particularly prominent in the provisions of EESA 
and has garnered serious attention from legal scholars is that of clawbacks, 
discussed next. 
                                                          
52 Columbia Symposium, Kenneth West, Pay Without Performance: An Executive’s Perspective 
on Bebchuk & Fried’s Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 
(Oct. 15, 2004). 
53 For example, an aggressive contract (characterized by high proportion of stock-based pay) is 
appropriate in a context characterized by talented managers exerting utmost effort to generate high 
value; the firm facing high operating risk; and, the degree of damage the manager can inflict on the firm 
through suboptimal investments being not too high.  See Kandel, supra note 12, at 426-27 (covering 
details on contingent pay contracts).  In contrast, a conservative contract (combination of fixed salary 
and incentive-pay with lower levels of stock-based pay) is optimal for a firm that can be severely 
damaged by short-term executive actions.  Id.  
54 While the executive may be well aware of his real ability and risk preferences, s/he is unlikely to 
reveal this to the firm. This information asymmetry between the executive (as agent) and shareholders 
(as principals) is a major contributor to the two problems discussed in agency theory: adverse selection 
and moral hazard.  See Fama, supra note 9, at 289-92.  Indeed, agency theorists have argued that equity-
based compensation plans when designed appropriately can help mitigate the incentive misalignment 
problem. 
RAJAGOPALAN_-_FORMAT_COMPLETE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:06 PM 
440 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW Vol. IV:II 
 
3.3 Clawbacks 
One of the key provisions of EESA was the requirement of clawbacks55 of 
any bonuses or incentive compensation paid to senior executives if subsequent 
financial reports were proven to be materially inaccurate.  More recently, the 
House of Representatives passed a bill (still pending in the Senate) to impose a 
retroactive marginal taxation rate of 90% on the bonuses paid to senior executives 
of AIG, following the outburst of public outrage in response to the bonus payments 
at the bailout firm.56  However, advocating the use of clawbacks in order to 
deprive executives of compensation allegedly earned illegally (or, more recently, 
perceived as unfair) is not a particularly new approach.  For instance, six years 
before the 2008 crisis, section 304 of SOX mandated that the CEO and CFO of any 
firm that had to restate its earnings due to material non-compliance of financial 
reporting requirements under the securities laws had to repay to their company any 
bonus or other incentive or equity-based compensation received during the twelve 
months following the filing of the inaccurate financial statement.  Section 304 also 
applied to any profits that were realized by the executives from the sale of stock 
within that twelve-month period, if the restatement had resulted from misconduct.  
However, the effectiveness of the clawback provision under section 304 has been 
rather limited, for two reasons.  First, there have been problems relating to 
interpretation; for instance, the statute does not specify what degree of misconduct 
or whose misconduct is necessary to activate the regulation.  Also, while the 
statute does not explicitly require the officer from whom the clawback is sought to 
have personally engaged in misconduct, subsequent interpretations of the statute 
have been quite narrow.  The second reason for the limited effectiveness of the 
section 304 clawback provision is that it gives enforcement rights only to the SEC.  
While a number of shareholders brought private securities lawsuits under section 
304, they were without any exceptions turned away by the courts.  In sum, due to 
interpretation as well as enforcement challenges, clawbacks under section 304 
have only been successfully implemented in a handful of cases.57  
In order to address some of the problems that have reportedly resulted in the 
low effectiveness of retroactive clawback provisions (such as attempts to recover 
bonus payments made to executives as in the recent AIG case), Cherry and Wong 
                                                          
55 See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of 
Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 370 (2009) (detailing an 
exhaustive treatment of clawbacks).  They define “clawback” “as a theory for recovering benefits that 
have been conferred under a claim of right, but that are nonetheless recoverable because unfairness 
would otherwise result.”  Id. at 371-72.   
This definition includes both retroactive clawbacks – those that, like the 
(pending) ninety percent tax on bonuses, are imposed after the contractual right 
to the bonuses has arisen and the benefits have been conferred – and prospective 
clawbacks that are introduced into contracts before the claim of right to the 
benefits has arisen.   
Id. at 372. 
56 See Liam Pleven et al., AIG Faces Growing Wrath Over Payouts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2009, at 
A1. 
57 Rachael E. Schwartz, The Clawback Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: An Underutilized Incentive to 
Keep the Corporate House Clean, 64 BUS. LAW. 1 (2008).  In the seven years since SOX has been in 
place, the SEC has only enforced two clawback actions.  Id. 
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advocate the use of “prospective clawbacks,” especially because such provisions 
reflect the voluntary adoption by corporations (perhaps, thus increasing their 
incentive to enforce it as well) and can be individually tailored to reflect company-
specific contingencies that, as noted earlier, make contingent, rather than one-size-
fit-all, pay schemes more attractive.58  Unlike retroactive clawbacks, which have to 
contend with existing contractual rights of executives to whom compensation has 
already been paid, with prospective clawbacks such contractual rights are 
automatically altered, allowing for the recoupment of bonuses.59  There is already 
some evidence that in the last two years some prominent, large publicly traded 
organizations like Dell, Intel and Morgan Stanley, have voluntarily adopted and 
implemented clawback provisions in their compensation policy.60  However, given 
the relative newness of prospective clawbacks, several unresolved and highly 
complex issues related to the function, the structure, and the desirability of 
contractual clawbacks must be carefully analyzed.61  It is especially important that, 
if these mechanisms are found to be quite effective in mitigating the compensation 
problems discussed throughout this report, they are adopted widely rather than 
sporadically.  That, in turn, may mandate formal legislation and regulatory 
enforcement mechanisms that have yet to be debated.  In sum, notwithstanding the 
attractiveness of clawbacks from a political standpoint (after all, the very public act 
of recovering compensation from executives whose reckless choices are perceived 
to have destroyed shareholder value and even hundreds of livelihoods may, at least 
temporarily, appease public sentiment) there are other less obvious pros and cons 
that need to be identified and debated rigorously.  While the legal issues 
surrounding clawbacks are beginning to gain some attention (as noted earlier), the 
potential effects, especially of prospective clawbacks, from a managerial selection 
and retention standpoint need closer attention.  For instance, will the voluntary 
adoption of clawback provisions prevent firms from attracting and retaining top 
managerial talent who may choose employers with less restrictive pay practices? 
3.4 Greater Shareholder Involvement in the Pay-Setting Process: Say-on-
Pay and the Role of Institutional Owners  
After 2002 (and in the post-Enron world), shareholder activism, influenced 
by the efforts of corporate governance activists, institutional investors, and even 
legislatures, increased significantly, and this increased activism is particularly 
visible in the increased pressure on corporations to accept “say-on-pay.”62  
                                                          
58 Cherry & Wong, supra note 55, at 38. 
59 Id.  They note, “[i]f there is a prospective clawback provision in the original contract, the 
winning investor no longer has those contractual and restitutionary claims under specified unfair 
enrichment circumstances, because they were modified by the clawback provision in the investor 
agreement.”  Id. 
60 Id. at 17-18.  
61 Cherry and Wong provide many good ideas related to this issue in their discussion of the 
potential impact of clawback provisions on other concepts within contract law doctrine.  See id. at 39-
42. 
62 Standard say-on-pay rules mandate that companies submit executive compensation packages to 
the shareholders for a non-binding advisory note.  Id.  In 2006, The American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), supported by a broader coalition of investors, 
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Supporters of say-on-pay view this as a low-cost mechanism to enhance dialogue 
between the board and shareholders over the design of compensation practices.  
While say-on-pay has been mandatory in the United Kingdom since 2002, and has 
been adopted since then by other countries including Australia, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden, it remains non-mandatory in the U.S.  Unfortunately, say-
on-pay measures are so recent that there is very limited empirical evidence on their 
effectiveness.  Based on a review of surveys undertaken in other countries where 
say-on-pay has been in effect as a mandatory practice for several years, Dew-
Becker concludes that while pay appears to have become more connected to 
performance in these contexts, there is little evidence that they have reduced the 
pay levels such that firms are unable to attract talent and pay them at market rates.  
Further, compensation packages are rejected very rarely, perhaps reflecting the 
improved communication between investors and board members, and special 
interest groups have rarely used pay proposals as levers for bargaining against the 
corporation.63  
Notwithstanding the generally positive experience of say-on-pay in other 
countries, some scholars in the U.S have expressed major reservations about 
broader federal legislation that would entitle shareholders of all public corporations 
to a vote on executive compensation.  One of the major objections is that say-on-
pay will erode the primacy of the board of directors in a major area of corporate 
governance: setting executive compensation.  It has also been noted that 
“shareholder involvement in corporate decision making seems likely to disrupt the 
very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable, the vesting of 
‘authoritative control’ in the board of directors.”64  Bainbridge also objects to say-
on-pay provisions on the grounds that most shareholders, constrained by 
information asymmetries (boards will have better and more complete information 
than the typical shareholder) and collective action (it is more difficult to mobilize 
very large, dispersed groups) problems, will tend to be rationally apathetic.65 
As noted in the preceding paragraph, a major challenge in implementing 
proposals centered around more active shareholder involvement in the governance 
of the public corporation stems from the widely dispersed nature of shareholdings 
in the typical large U.S. corporation because of which it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to mobilize broad-based shareholder interest and involvement in the 
governance process.66  However, institutional owners67 are not subject to the same 
                                                          
launched a campaign for the adoption of say-on-pay.  See Narayanan, Ferri & Brem, supra note 2, at 7.  
In 2007, a say-on-pay bill was approved by the House of Representatives and a similar bill was 
introduced in the Senate as well.  See Narayanan, Ferri & Brem, supra note 2, at 7.  In February 2009, 
the U.S. Treasury announced a policy under which banks receiving “exceptional assistance” under the 
ongoing government bailout must fully disclose their executive compensation arrangements and obtain 
a non-binding shareholder vote on that structure.  See Narayanan, Ferri & Brem, supra note 2, at 7.  
This is the first legally mandated say-on-pay provision in the U.S.  See Narayanan, Ferri & Brem, supra 
note 2, at 7. 
63 See Dew-Becker, supra note 22. 
64 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, 32 REG. 42, 46 (2009). 
65 Id. 
66 The separation of ownership and control is a central feature of the U.S. corporate governance 
context where ownership rests with distant and diffuse shareholders while control is exercised by hired 
managers.  See Mark J. Roe, The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance, 1 CORP. 
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constraints as the average shareholder in that they typically have a sizeable 
ownership or block holding in the firm and have experienced increasing power in 
the past twenty years.68  Their increased power is evident in the number of 
instances of institutional owners challenging executives’ agendas and attempting to 
influence or change target firms’ governance practices.69  Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that large institutional owners can play a critical role in mitigating 
conflicts around executive compensation.  Most recently, institutional owners 
played a key role in motivating Royal Dutch Shell PLC to implement major 
changes in its senior executive compensation practices, including a two percent 
reduction in the salaries paid to the CEO and CFO relative to their predecessors 
and a ban on the award of performance-based shares to top three executives if they 
failed to meet targets.  Standard Life Investments, an institutional shareholder, 
played a key role in the shareholder-staged revolt against executive compensation 
policies.70  Available empirical evidence also largely supports anecdotal evidence 
that institutional investors can reduce executives’ power in the compensation 
setting process.  Hartzell and Starks found that institutional owners with large 
stakes lowered total compensation.71  Other studies have similarly found that 
ownership stakes by institutional owners are negatively related to CEO total pay,72 
especially when the institutional owner is actively involved in the governance 
process and is resistant to pressure from the firm’s managers.73  In addition, 
Hartzell and Starks also found that large institutional owners act as more effective 
monitors in that they are associated with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity.74  
Notwithstanding the many salutary effects of institutional investors on 
executive compensation, however, there are several challenges that place limits on 
                                                          
GOVERNANCE L. REV. 1 (2004).  Roe notes that separation of ownership and control is an important 
cause for the breakdowns in corporate governance among major U.S. public corporations including the 
competitive failures in the 1970s and 80s, excessive pay in the 90s, and the collapse of Enron in more 
recent history.  See id.  On the positive side, separation enhances the firm’s ability to hire and retain 
qualified managers and also increases the availability of financial capital.  See id.  On the negative side, 
however, this separation also results in the entrenchment of powerful managers who may pursue self-
serving behaviors to the detriment of owners.  See id.   
67 Institutional owners are organizations such as banks, mutual funds, insurance companies, public 
and private pension funds, and investment companies.  See Lori V. Ryan & Marguerite Schneider, The 
Antecedents of Institutional Investor Activism, 27 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 554 (2002) (providing an 
empirical study of the evolving role of institutional ownership). 
68 See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder 
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275 (2000). 
69 See Diana Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins, The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund 
Activism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1999). 
70 Guy Chazan, Shell Plans to Reduce Executive Salaries, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2010. 
71 Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation, 58 J. 
FIN. 2351, 2366 (2003). 
72 See R. Khan et al., Institutional Ownership and CEO Compensation: A Longitudinal 
Examination, 58 J. BUS. RES. 1078 (2005). 
73 See A. Almazan et al., Active Institutional Investors and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence From 
Executive Compensation, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5 (2005); see also P. David et al., The Effect of Institutional 
Investors On the Level and Mix of CEO Compensation, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 200 (1998). 
74 Hartzell, supra note 71, at 2366.  Hartzell and Starks report that large institutional shareholders 
lowered total compensation levels for executives thus “ensuring that management does not expropriate 
rents from shareholders in the form of greater compensation.”  Id.  They also note that these 
shareholders are associated with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity.  Id.     
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the effectiveness of this mechanism.  The interests of institutional investors may 
not always align with those of the ordinary investor75 and these differences can be 
further exacerbated by differences in their temporal horizons, the business ties of 
the owner to the firm, the owner’s propensity to engage in active monitoring, and 
the importance of the firm within the owner’s portfolio.76  Further, even in cases 
where investor-prompted resolutions are passed with a majority, such resolutions 
remain advisory in nature and boards (and executives) can choose to ignore the 
wishes of their large shareholders, unless the owners resort to more public 
confrontational modes.77  Institutional investors may also be reluctant to voice 
objections to an executive compensation package because of the potential for 
adverse stock market reactions and damage to the investor’s relationships with the 
firm’s executives.78 
3.5 Greater Transparency and Completeness in Disclosures of Executive Pay 
Arrangements 
There is a broad agreement in the literature that disclosure requirements have 
improved significantly over the past decade especially since the passage of SOX in 
2002.  Dew-Becker identifies the following provisions within SOX as directly 
relevant to executive compensation.79  First, SOX disallowed corporations from 
granting loans to their executives.  Second, if the financial statements (required to 
be personally certified by the CFO and CEO) are materially revised, the CEO is 
required to refund the corporation 100% of his performance-based pay (i.e., the 
clawback provision discussed in an earlier section).  Third, the majority of the 
board has to be independent (with more stringent definitions of independence 
especially in relation to the compensation committee) and the independent 
directors are required meet without the presence of inside directors at least once a 
year.  These regulations were followed by further tightening of disclosure rules by 
the SEC in 2006, including broader and more specific requirements for reporting 
director pay, deferred compensation, severance and retirement packages, 
performance targets for incentive plans, option valuations, and dollar amounts for 
                                                          
75 Bainbridge, supra note 64, at 46.   The author raises this as a primary objection to increased 
interventions by institutional owners.  He says,  
The interests of unions as investors differ radically from those of ordinary 
investors. The pension fund of the union representing Safeway workers, for 
example, is trying to oust directors who stood up to the union in collective 
bargaining negotiations.  Union pension funds have used shareholder proposals to 
obtain employee benefits they couldn’t get through bargaining . . . [i]ndeed, the 
LA Times recently reported that CalPERS’ renewed activism is being “fueled 
partly by the political ambitions of Phil Angelides, California’s state treasurer 
and a CalPERS board member, who is considering running for governor of 
California in 2006.”  
Id. at 47. 
76 P. Brandes et al., Navigating Shareholder Influence: Compensation Plans and the Shareholder 
Approval Process, 22 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 41 (2008). 
77 The Shareholders’ Revolt, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2006, at 71. 
78 See Conway, supra note 13, at 403. 
79 See Dew-Becker, supra note 22, at 449. 
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all components of compensation.80 
The new chief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Mary L. 
Schapiro, is especially being lauded for her efforts in pushing for more 
transparency when it comes to reporting executive pay.81  However, there is also a 
widely-shared belief (especially since the most recent financial crisis) that there is 
considerable room for further increasing the completeness and transparency of 
executive compensation arrangements.  Bebchuk and Fried propose the following 
specific steps to substantially increase the transparency of the pay process: placing 
a dollar value on all forms of compensation, disclosure of all non-deductible 
compensation, expensing of stock options, reporting of the relationship between 
pay and performance based on industry peers’ performance benchmarks, and 
unloading of shares and options by top five executives.82  Kandel takes these 
recommendations a step further in proposing that every firm must be required to 
publish two compensation-focused reports along with its annual report.  In the first 
report, the firm must disclose the complete details of the contract signed with its 
executives, including its exact ex-ante cost to shareholders and related tax 
implications.83  The second report must provide the actual payment schedule from 
the firm to the manager and should link each payment made to the specific contract 
it was awarded under.  
Interestingly, while there is a general consensus about the need for greater 
transparency in the reporting of executive pay, increased transparency and 
additional reporting may have contributed, inadvertently, to the increase in 
executive pay levels during the Nineties.  For instance, Hall observes that  
the use of surveys was encouraged by rule changes in 1993 that required companies 
to detail more fully the pay of their top executives in company proxy statements.  
One of the hopes of the new rules was that greater disclosure would slow the 
increase in executive pay, with the publicity about high pay working to curb abuses.  
But once executives began to see more clearly how much their peers were making, 
they wanted more – and boards granted more.  Thus, although disclosure generally 
curbs excesses, in this case it may have had the opposite effect.84 
                                                          
80 Id. at 443-44. 
81 Floyd Norris, A Window Opens on Pay for Bosses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at B1.  Norris 
notes, “[i]n less than a year, Ms. Schapiro has established a reputation for careful but determined 
reform, of the commission itself and of the market it regulates.”  Id.  The new rules for compensation 
reporting mandated by the SEC “will require companies to disclose if compensation policies are 
increasing the risk of the company having to take large losses, as seems to have happened in financial 
institutions before the crisis.”  Id. 
82 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & J.M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. 
APPL. CORP. FIN. 8 (2005) (providing a more detailed discussion of each of these steps). 
83 Kandel, supra note 12, at 416.  He elaborates:  
This report must include all the planned financial obligations of the firm towards 
the top manager in the coming year.  The firm must be required to obtain outside 
estimates for the costs of various benefits the manager receives . . . .The cost of 
the package to the firm’s shareholders must be compared to several mandatory 
benchmarks . . . .[The report] should include all the shareholdings of the 
manager. 
Id. 
84 Hall, supra note 49, at 32.  
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3.6 Increased Board Vigilance, Monitoring, and Accountability (Including 
Shareholder Lawsuits) 
At a fundamental level, lapses in executive pay arrangements reflect a 
breakdown in corporate governance in that boards have failed to rein in excessive 
executive pay and push for a stronger alignment between incentive pay and firm 
performance.85  Recent regulatory reforms mandate that most companies listed on 
major stock exchanges in the U.S. should have a majority of independent directors 
(i.e., they should not be employees of the firm nor should they have business 
relationships with the firm).  However, while these reforms may have reduced to 
some extent managers’ power over the board, they appear to have fallen 
considerably short when it comes to addressing the executive pay problems 
documented earlier.  While some companies have strong and independent boards, 
others are populated by close associates of the CEO, thereby corrupting the pay 
process.  In support of this assertion, several studies have found that companies 
with weaker boards award greater pay to their top executives than do firms with 
stronger boards.86  The excessive risk-taking by some financial firms that 
precipitated the 2008 financial crisis (noted in the examples in the introduction 
section of the Article) is also widely believed to have been encouraged by 
improperly designed compensation systems and inadequate monitoring of 
executive decisions by corporate boards.87  A recent report of the Conference 
Board notes: 
[I]n performing their duties, directors should be mindful of their responsibility to 
create sustainable, long-term wealth for all shareholders.  It means designing 
compensation arrangements suitable to: 1) Attract and retain key talent in a 
competitive marketplace; 2) motivate managers in the pursuit of long-term goals; 
and 3) reward managers financially based on their actual performance.88  
To achieve these objectives, the report identifies several practical actions 
especially focusing on the role of the board’s compensation committee.  The 
board’s compensation committee has to not only fully understand the effects of 
                                                          
85 See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 11, at 22.  They observe,  
Past and current flaws in executive pay arrangements have resulted from 
underlying problems within the corporate governance system: specifically, 
directors’ lack of sufficient incentives to focus solely on shareholder interests 
when setting pay.  If directors could be relied on to focus on shareholder 
interests, the pay-setting process, and broad oversight of executives more 
generally, would be greatly improved.   
Id. 
86 See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002); Hall, supra note 49, at 32; Murphy, supra note 17.  See 
generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 11, at 22. 
87 In recent decisions, Delaware courts have emphasized the importance of good faith as part of the 
director’s duty of loyalty and have noted that directors are expected to understand current best practices, 
as well as ensure that business decisions are consistent with widely accepted corporate governance 
standards.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 
(Del. 2006) (focusing on Chancellor Chandler’s dicta).  
88 Matteo Tonello, Overseeing Risk Management and Executive Compensation “Pressure Points” 
for Corporate Directors 1, 5 (Executive Action Series, Conference Board Paper No. 292, 2008). 
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each single component of the pay package, but also consider a wide array of 
financial and non-financial performance metrics and targets, use such metrics 
during the performance evaluation of each top executive, disclose performance 
targets to shareholders, and set compensation levels based on multiple external 
benchmarks.  In addition, the report also argues that it is the responsibility of the 
board to oversee the firm’s risk exposure because this “duty is inherent in 
determining a business strategy that generates long-term shareholder value” and 
“may be inferred from the provisions of SOX on internal controls.”89 
While there is widespread agreement on the important (ex-ante) roles that 
boards can (and should) play in the pay-setting and monitoring process, there is 
also increasing  recognition of the need to hold boards more accountable (ex-post) 
when they fail to fulfill their fiduciary duties.90  Bebchuk and Fried argue that not 
only must shareholders have the power to replace directors in the wake of poor 
performance but shareholders, and not the board, should have the power to initiate 
and adopt changes in governance arrangements in the corporate charter.91  
However, most of the cases that have been brought against directors by 
shareholders for paying executives excessive compensation have failed because 
courts are generally unwilling to question the decisions boards make under the 
principle of business judgment.92  While many state legislatures have created 
statues that allow shareholders to seek recourse if a board is not sufficiently 
regulating executive compensation, courts have often responded unfavorably in 
such cases.93  Finally, as observed earlier in the discussion of the say-on-pay 
initiatives, there is also concern that the separation of ownership and control, a 
bedrock of the American corporate governance system, may be seriously 
undermined if the balance of power were to shift too much in the direction of 
shareholders at the expense of a firm’s board or its managers.94 
CONCLUSION 
This Article started with a brief summary of the major provisions under the 
EESA enacted in response to the financial crisis of 2008.  These regulations were 
aimed at curbing excessive compensation payments made to executives whose 
                                                          
89 Id. 
90 See Dew-Becker, supra note 22, at 450.  The fiduciary duties of boards of directors can be 
divided into a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.  Id.  The duty of loyalty says that the directors must act 
in the best interest of shareholders, rather than themselves.  Id.  The duty of care means that directors 
must take due care in their decisions and must base these decisions on all relevant information and 
applicable governance standards and laws.  Id.   
91 See Bebchuk & Fried, Compensation at Fannie Mae, supra note 4, at 22-23. 
92 See Dew-Becker, supra note 22, at 450.  The principle of business judgment dictates that as long 
as the process is considered reasonable and deliberative and the board had no personal stake, courts are 
unlikely to question the soundness of the actual decision and whether it reflected a breach of fiduciary 
duties.  Id.   
93 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27 (2006) (holding that the board of directors did not 
breach its fiduciary duties and the payment to Disney CEO Michael Ovitz did not constitute a waste of 
corporate assets despite Ovitz receiving $130 million in severance payment for only fourteen months of 
service on a five year contract).  
94 See Bainbridge, supra note 64, at 42; see also Roe, supra note 66, at 18-19 (providing a more 
balanced discussion of the implications of the separation of ownership and control).  
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reckless risk-taking has been widely acknowledged as a major contributor to the 
near-disastrous collapse of the financial sector and the related economic crises.  
However, as noted in the introduction, the two underlying problems brought to the 
fore by the financial crisis and the reforms it precipitated have received 
considerable attention from legislators as well as academic scholars.  The desire to 
address these two problems (excessive executive pay levels and the low sensitivity 
of pay to performance) lies at the heart of several tax-related reforms enacted since 
the 1980s, as well as several other regulations aimed at controlling or influencing 
the content of pay packages and the process through which pay-related decisions 
are made.  The evidence presented in Section 2 of the Article shows that, for the 
most part, tax policy has been a blunt policy instrument with significant gaps 
between the legislative intent and realized outcomes.  The review of other non-tax-
policy options (discussed in Section 3 of the Article), however, also reveals that 
these options create other challenges related to designing and implementing 
executive pay packages that protect and enhance shareholder value. 
Interestingly, while the recent financial crisis (and ensuing reforms) has 
focused attention squarely on excessive executive compensation, the challenges 
discussed in this Article bring to the fore two foundational characteristics of the 
American corporate governance system discussed by Roe: the separation of 
ownership from control and the decentralized regulatory system.95 
Because of the separation of ownership from control, managers can enjoy 
tremendous discretion not only in terms of making specific business decisions, but 
also in terms of choosing the type and extent of managerial rewards.  Boards of 
directors are expected to represent the interests of shareholders and ensure that 
managers are monitored effectively (designing and enforcing appropriate pay 
packages is also part of the board’s monitoring duty), but, as evidenced in the 
continued growth of executive pay and the very weak pay-for-performance 
relationship, boards have been relatively unsuccessful.  Boards play a particularly 
crucial role in mitigating executive pay problems because they are closer to the 
executives of the firm than the typical shareholder, who is either too distant or too 
marginal to have any tangible impact.  The problem of information asymmetry 
(e.g., managers know more about their own abilities, risk preferences, and potential 
decision outcomes, than the owners do) associated with the separation of 
ownership and control is not one that can be effectively dealt with by the 
shareholder of a large corporation.  Instead, a vigilant, qualified, and experienced 
board is in a much better position.  The misalignment of incentives between the 
owners and managers (also a byproduct of the separation of ownership and control) 
can also, to a large extent, be addressed by vigilant boards that pay close attention 
to individual managers’ track records and company-specific contingencies in 
designing incentive pay schemes, and hold their executives responsible when they 
fail to deliver outcomes agreed on in ex-ante pay contracts.  While extant 
regulations have focused on increasing board independence, there has been much 
less attention to the other important antecedent to board effectiveness: board 
experience and knowledge.  Unless board members have relevant experience and 
                                                          
95 See Roe, supra note 66, at 2-4. 
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knowledge, especially in the industry their company operates in, they are unlikely 
to understand key context-specific contingencies that will affect the 
appropriateness of different types of pay packages.  In this regard, McClendon has 
argued that self-regulatory organizations like the New York Stock Exchange 
should adopt new listing standards that strengthen board ability as well as 
accountability in linking executive compensation to long-term corporate 
performance.96  Such standards should include, among others, limiting board 
memberships so that directors can pay more attention to the firms whose boards 
they sit on, and mandating industry experience in at least a subset of the board.  
Institutional shareholders can also be very useful because, as often noted by the 
renowned investor Warren Buffet, they have the knowledge as well as the power to 
influence the boards of the companies in which they have substantial equity 
stakes.97  The ability of institutional investors to successfully pressurize boards can 
also be enhanced by regulations that force more transparent and complete reporting 
of executive pay packages and performance metrics, especially in relation to 
industry-specific benchmarks.  
The second fundamental structural characteristic of the American corporate 
governance system noted by Roe is also relevant to the current debate on executive 
compensation reform: the existence of a decentralized regulatory system where 
multiple agencies (e.g., SEC, FTC, PCAOB) regulate different, sometimes even 
overlapping, domains of corporate conduct and there is no centralized regulatory 
agency responsible for overseeing corporate governance.  While decentralized and 
pluralistic regulation has its advantages (among them, checks and balances and 
multiple points of oversight), the system can also lead to lapses in enforcement, 
multiple sometimes conflicting interpretation of the same regulation, leading to 
loopholes and regulatory gaps ripe for opportunistic exploitation by the regulated.  
The Obama Administration’s recent appointment of a federal pay czar (Kenneth 
Feinberg) to oversee the executive compensation practices at bailout companies,98 
while potentially offensive to federalism principles that dictate such regulatory 
powers be left to the discretion of individual state authorities, has been quite 
effective in dramatically reducing executive pay packages at financial firms that 
have not repaid the money borrowed from the federal government.  However, a 
method that is effective in achieving reforms for a comparatively small set of firms 
(those required to subject their practices to Feinberg’s scrutiny based on their 
participation in the government’s TARP initiative) may not necessarily transfer 
readily to the more general corporate context.   
In sum, market mechanisms guided by thoughtful and consistent regulation 
may still be the most effective means of ensuring competitive pay practices and 
                                                          
96 See Janice K. McClendon, The Perfect Storm: How Mortgage-Backed Securities, Federal 
Deregulation, and Corporate Greed Provide a Wakeup Call for Reforming Executive Compensation, 12 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 131, 145-47 (2009). 
97 See Steven Brill, What’s a Bailed-Out Banker Really Worth?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2010, at 
MM32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/magazine/03Compensation-t.html?pagewante 
d=1&_r=1. 
98 See Jim Puzzanghera, Corporate Salaries; Pay Czar Hits Execs in Their Wallets; Feinberg 
Slashes the Compensation for the Highest Earners at Five TARP Recipients, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 
2010, at B1. 
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curbing executive behaviors that destroy shareholder value.  Nevertheless, 
predictive power in this context is necessarily limited, and thus ex-ante regulatory 
mechanisms must be supplemented by ex-post counterparts such as litigation (and 
judicial cooperation) to ensure that executives and boards are ultimately held 
accountable for governance decisions that reflect serious breaches of fiduciary 
duty.  Thus, reforms that target executive compensation in isolation are not likely 
to have significant positive effects; they must be accompanied by wide-ranging 
changes that go to the heart of the corporate governance system. 
 
